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Introduction 
 
 
European Defence in View of Brexit 
Europe’s military power might not suffer, but its political clout is at risk 
Claudia Major and Alicia von Voss 
The United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Theresa May’s official request, on March 29th, 
to leave the European Union (EU) will change the way European countries organise their 
defence policies. Europeans have always managed their defence via various channels: 
nationally, in the EU, through NATO and in smaller formats. Brexit will change the way 
these formats function and how they interact. The effect on the EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) will be limited. NATO might benefit from a greater UK com-
mitment, as can smaller formats. The result will be greater fragmentation in European 
defence, which risks weakening the Europeans’ political and military capacity to act. 
 
Brexit affects all channels in which Euro-
peans organise their defence policies, 
whether directly (those in the EU) or 
indirectly (those outside, such as NATO). 
Although Brexit is unlikely to damage 
Europe’s single set of forces, that is, the 
sum of all military forces in Europe, the 
Europeans’ political capacity to act is likely 
to suffer from the poisoned atmosphere 
and the questions about Europe’s future 
that the Brexit negotiations could generate. 
New Initiatives in the CSDP 
EU countries organise their defence only 
to a very small degree in the CSDP, which 
concentrates on military and civilian crisis 
management and security, such as training 
security forces in Mali. Defence in a narrow 
sense – meaning the protection of popula-
tions, territorial integrity and of the func-
tioning of the state- remains largely NATO’s 
task. The EU’s contribution to defence is 
mainly the attempt to coordinate capability 
cooperation, such as through the European 
Defence Agency (EDA), and to consolidate 
Europe’s defence industry. 
Brexit is likely to have little effect on the 
CSDP, if compared to other EU policy areas 
such as the Single Market, firstly, because 
the CSDP is organised intergovernmentally: 
States did not delegate their decision-
making authority to a supranational EU 
institution. They still decide on a case-by-
case basis, for example whether to launch 
an operation. Hence, disentangling the UK 
from the CSDP will be easier, simply be-
cause there are fewer legal obligations and 
common structures. 
Secondly, Brexit will have little impact 
on the CSDP because the UK has not been 
a key player in recent years. Rather, it has 
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blocked the CSDP on different occasions, 
such as by vetoing an EU Headquarters and 
an increase of the EDA’s budget. In the last 
years, it did not launch meaningful initia-
tives, nor did it consider the CSDP a core 
channel for its security and defence policy. 
Although it contributed personnel and 
equipment (such as Northwood HQ for the 
EU Operation Atalanta), these contributions 
did not reflect its military capabilities. 
Brexit thus formalises the reluctance that 
the UK has had towards the CSDP. 
Rather than suffering from Brexit, many 
observers hope that the CSDP will benefit 
from it, for it removes the UK veto. Indeed, 
since the Brexit vote, ideas on how to im-
prove the CSDP have flourished. At the 
September 2016 Bratislava summit, states 
agreed to strengthen EU cooperation on 
external security and defence. At the De-
cember 2016 European Council meeting 
they focussed on three priorities: imple-
menting the EU Global Strategy in security 
and defence; the Commission’s European 
Defence Action Plan; and a follow-up of the 
EU-NATO Joint Declaration, signed at the 
2016 NATO Warsaw summit. In parallel, EU 
states from Finland to Italy exchanged non-
papers on how to take the CSDP to the next 
level. Most states then rallied behind the 
Franco-German ideas, which call to make 
better use of the treaties, such as by imple-
menting Permanent Structured Cooper-
ation, setting up a European Medical Com-
mand and starting a CSDP research pro-
gramme. Yet, the hope that the CSDP could 
finally prosper without the UK ignores at 
least four things. First, the UK is not the 
only CSDP sceptic country. Others, such 
as Poland, have been comfortable hiding 
behind the UK and must now speak up. 
Second, current proposals mainly target 
institutions. Although they will improve 
CSDP’s practical work, such as an HQ in the 
area of planning, they do not address the 
political problem of a lacking support from 
the states. The CSDP’s main problem is that 
Europeans have a proven alternative for 
defence – NATO. Hence, there is little pres-
sure to set up a policy within the EU. 
CSDP’s limited success is not only due to 
the British block on structural develop-
ment. It results from a lack of trust of the 
Europeans in the capacity of the EU to 
deliver on defence. 
Third, France and Germany, the driving 
forces behind the current initiatives, have 
not yet been able to show results. There is 
little agreement on the nature of engage-
ments, the geographic priorities, and the 
industrial aspects. If the two do not agree, 
initiatives are unlikely to be implemented. 
Fourth, current ideas call for a deeper 
integration, which means abandoning 
national sovereignty. In view of rising euro-
sceptic parties (beyond the election cam-
paigns in France and elsewhere), which 
criticise the loss of sovereignty and want 
to take back control, it is unlikely that this 
integrationist push will get much support. 
But Little Change in the CSDP 
Thus, fundamental change is unlikely. Yet, 
Brexit is likely to trigger stepwise modifica-
tions that reinforce CSDP’s capacities in 
crisis management and security (but not its 
defence profile). First, states are likely to 
upgrade CSDP governance to improve the 
practical work. In March 2017, they set up 
a Military Planning and Conduct Capability 
for non-executive operations, a precursor 
for an HQ. The Preparatory Action, launch-
ing €90 million for CSDP-related research, 
will start mid-2017 and will run until 2020. 
It could pave the way for a European 
Defence (Research) Budget under the EU 
Multiannual Financial Framework. 
The second likely change concerns opera-
tions and capabilities. The UK is a military 
power, one of only five EU states to have an 
OHQ able to command an operation, and it 
possesses high-end capabilities not many 
Europeans have, such as ISR (Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance). On paper, 
the EU is losing the UK’s considerable mili-
tary capabilities, which amount to about 
20 per cent of Europe’s overall capabilities. 
But given that the UK has always been 
reluctant to put its defence power at the 
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EU’s disposal, Brexit is not likely to make a 
big difference in practical terms. Likewise, 
the UK has not excelled in EU capability 
cooperation, existing frameworks, such as 
EDA, will not suffer. Yet, in theoretical 
terms, things do change: The EU countries 
agreed on levels of ambition (LoA), that is, 
what the EU aims to carry out in terms of 
operations. The EU will be obliged to lower 
those LoA, as it can no longer count on the 
UK’s capabilities. 
A third likely change is a reduced strate-
gic outlook that might inhibit the CSDP: 
A limitation in the EU’s military capabili-
ties also limits the Union’s military aspira-
tions, and thus affects its broader ambi-
tions. The UK brought a particular strategic 
culture to the EU, characterised by a global 
outlook. It is difficult to measure the loss 
of such strategic thinking following Brexit. 
Yet, it is likely that it will not only affect 
the internal debates on what the EU should 
do, and how, but also the view that the out-
side world has of the EU. External actors 
might perceive the EU as being less ambi-
tious, more inward-looking, and less willing 
and capable to act on the global stage. 
NATO as Beneficiary 
The UK leaves the EU, but not Europe; secu-
rity problems in and around the continent 
will still affect Britain. Yet, if after Brexit 
the UK can no longer shape collective 
answers to these challenges inside the EU, 
it could turn to other formats, the likely 
beneficiaries being NATO and smaller coop-
eration formats. 
With regard to NATO, the UK already 
voiced its intent to strengthen its commit-
ment, yet without specifying what this 
means. London seems to increase its person-
nel in NATO and aims to take a political 
lead. It refers to its contributions to NATO’s 
deterrence and defence measures, such 
as the role as lead nation within NATO’s 
Enhanced Forward Presence. Yet, these 
decisions were made prior to Brexit and can 
thus hardly serve as a token of a new com-
mitment. Besides, a stronger military role 
cannot be taken for granted: If the Brexit 
process affects the economy, the UK’s 
ability to achieve the LoA and capabilities – 
as set out in the 2015 Strategic Defence and 
Security Review – will suffer. Even if the UK 
sticks to the 2 per cent of GDP spending 
goal for defence, there will be less money if 
the overall GDP shrinks. If the pound loses 
value, procurement abroad will be more 
expensive, planned capabilities could be-
come unaffordable, or the timing and num-
bers of procurement could change. Finally, 
if the UK’s unity were to be questioned, 
such as through another Scottish indepen-
dence referendum (as requested by Scot-
land in March 2017), budget priorities 
might shift. 
Nevertheless, there is a chance that 
NATO could benefit from a stronger UK 
commitment, as it will be the only defence 
forum in Europe in which the UK can still 
play a role – and which would allow Lon-
don to underpin its “global Britain” ambi-
tions. As a result, NATO could gain in im-
portance as a platform for debates, policy, 
and capability development among Euro-
peans. In an ironic twist, although it weak-
ens the EU, Brexit could thus strengthen 
the European pillar in NATO. 
Smaller Formats Might Prosper 
The second likely beneficiary are multilat-
eral defence cooperation formats outside 
the EU and NATO. This applies in particular 
to the Franco-British Lancaster House 
Treaties, launched in 2010, which set up 
cooperation in the nuclear realm, capabili-
ties, and even industrial issues. Both states 
expressed their wishes to deepen this link, 
such as by launching specialised Centres of 
Excellence for missile technology in 2016. 
Besides, both countries share an ambitious 
and outward-looking strategic culture and 
rely on each other for issues such as the 
fight against the so-called Islamic State. 
The UK also aims to revive its coopera-
tion in the Northern Group, which com-
prises northern European countries, includ-
ing Germany. London values the Joint Expe-
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ditionary Force, which consists of Denmark, 
the Baltics, the Netherlands, and Norway. 
Also, the UK and Germany aim to intensify 
their cooperation, such as in cyber security. 
A further appeal of those formats is that 
they can serve as a link for the UK into the 
EU, and possibly as a way to channel UK 
interests into EU debates. Yet, although 
cooperation in small groups seems easier, 
these groups risk undermining the EU and 
NATO in the long term. 
Fragmentation of European Defence 
Overall, a further differentiation of tasks 
between NATO and the EU seems likely. 
Rather than create a defence capacity inside 
the EU, the CSDP is likely to concentrate on 
crisis management and capability coopera-
tion, whereas NATO will stick to its (opera-
tional) defence tasks. Yet, if the EU – via 
new research funds, financial incentives for 
cooperation, and the opening of defence 
markets – were able to support capability 
development, Europe’s overall defence 
would benefit: The states could use such an 
improved single set of forces in the EU and 
NATO (and the UN, for that matter). 
Yet, there is a risk that Brexit might create 
a more fragmented and inward-looking EU, 
less able to shape regional order. Not only 
will the implementation of Brexit occupy 
the EU and the UK for some time and might 
affect mutual trust. Both face domestic 
issues as well. The UK needs to deliver on 
Brexit promises while keeping the Union 
together (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland). 
The EU has to avoid further centrifugal ten-
dencies and define its future integration 
model. It is likely to suffer from the politi-
cal fallout from Brexit, that is, a lack of 
unity and doubts about the EU project as 
such. Other exit votes are unlikely, but ref-
erenda on certain aspects of EU obligations 
that countries do not like, in addition to a 
certain disdain for EU rules risk affecting 
EU unity. Yet, political agreement is the pre-
condition for EU collective action. A Europe 
that is occupied with itself risks paying less 
attention to external threats and has less 
weight on the international stage. This is 
worrying in view of existing challenges and 
the uncertainty about the US commitment 
to European defence, which has questioned 
the viability of NATO and the EU. 
Rethink European Defence 
The main challenge for the UK and the EU 
will be to define the UK’s role and to re-
think European defence. For the CSDP, the 
existing third-party agreement (from which 
more than 40 non-EU states benefit) offers a 
starting point for future UK contributions. 
It allows non-members to join EU opera-
tions but gives them next to no role in their 
design. It might be worth considering to 
offer the UK a special status to involve them 
in planning processes earlier in order to 
provide incentives for UK contributions. 
Non-EU states can also participate in EDA 
activities if they wish to do so. A regular EU-
UK dialogue would allow for finding com-
mon ground on operations, industrial and 
capability cooperation, which would be of 
mutual interest. Also, NATO would benefit 
from a functioning EU-UK relationship, as it 
would ease the implementation of the 2016 
EU-NATO Joint Declaration. 
The next step is to conceptually rethink 
European defence. Most Europeans tend to 
link the solutions to their security prob-
lems to institutions, mainly the EU and 
NATO. Yet, both have limitations. NATO re-
mains a military alliance. Crucial tools that 
deal with non-military threats remain with 
the EU or the states. The CSDP offers a con-
tribution to security, yet key instruments 
lie with the Commission and the states. It is 
hence misleading to ask which institution 
will organise European defence. The key 
questions are how Europeans can ensure 
effective defence and identify the needed 
capabilities to protect populations, states, 
and borders. The importance of institutions 
lies in the bundling of forces and ideas, 
and fostering agreements where necessary. 
The states’ role is to ensure the coordina-
tion between the various formats, and offer 
political leadership. 
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